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The aim of the paper is to study the relation between the demand for human rights and for 
economic prosperity. It analyzes the demand not, as it is often done in the literature, from the 
“voice” perspective (political activity), but rather looks at the “exit” perspective (migration 
patterns).  Given  the  difficulties  associated  with  identification  in  international  samples  we 
study the intra-national migration in a federation with significant economic and political dif-
ferences between states – India. The paper finds that quality of human rights protection and 
economic well-being are substitutes when determining the patterns of migration: lower num-
ber of human rights violations acts as a “pull” factor for individual states only if the income 
per capita is small enough; increasing economic well-being political regimes seem to be able 
to “buy acceptance” of the lower quality of human rights. The results are robust to various 
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1  Introduction 
The interrelation between the economic development and the democratization has been ac-
tively discussed in the economics and political science literature. As early as Lipset (1959) 
argued that economic well-being (and, generally speaking, economic modernization) is likely 
to contribute to the democratization. The empirical studies so far remain controversial in spite 
of the significant proliferation of the empirical literature and advancements in terms of uncov-
ering the causal mechanisms and various robustness checks (see Wucherpfennig and Deutsch 
2009 for a systematic review of the literature). However, this work mostly focuses on the de-
mocratization as such, rarely disentangling the outcomes of this process and the demand for 
democratization, i.e. whether democratization is preferred by the population (for a given level 
of costs associated with the political change). Democratic transition is not necessarily a func-
tion of the popular demand for democracy and may be just “unintended” outcome of bargain-
ing over rents and resources (as, for instance, in the model of Acemoglu and Robinson 2001), 
but the importance of the popular acceptance of democratic values and thus demand for de-
mocracy has been repeatedly emphasized in the literature (see e.g. Granato et al. 1996 for a 
debate on this topic). The history is full with examples of democratization projects, which 
failed rather because of the absent demand of the people (willingly voting for prospective 
autocrats) then because of the absence of the democratic institutions: the Second Empire in 
France, the Third Reich in Germany or the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin may rep-
resent examples of this trend.  
The effects of the economic prosperity on the demand for democracy, however, at least ex 
ante seem to be ambiguous. On the one hand, higher income and higher standards of living 
may cause greater interest in (and provide greater opportunities for) the political participation 
(which in many instance is prohibitively expensive for the excessively poor brackets of soci-
ety, see also Frey 1971). Therefore increasing well-being could enhance the demand for de-
mocracy. On the other hand, higher income makes the opportunity costs for fighting for de-
mocracy higher. In addition it, generally speaking, may outweigh (in the eyes of the popula-
tion) the benefits of political democracy. A further questionable aspect is the interrelation 
between democracy and stability of property rights: while Ben-Yishay and Betancourt (2007) 
point out that at least civil liberties and private property are strongly interrelated, other aspects 
of democratic politics may enhance redistribution and populist economic policies. The his-
torical experience is also mixed: the stability of fast-growing autocracy in China and the suc-
cess of the de-democratization in the period of high oil prices in Russia have partly been at-
tributed to the ability of these governments to “buy” the support of the population through 
relatively high growth rates – although there is a lot of speculation going on regarding the 
persistence of this equilibrium. In some cases autocrats seem to deliberately exploit this trade 
off:  in March 2011, while addressing his people, king of Saudi Arabia Abdullah explicitly 
thanked his subjects for keeping the stability of the state (in the environment of significant 
turbulences in the Arab world), and declared an increase of the minimal wages and unem-
ployment benefits. On the other hand, the public protests in Bahrain in February-March 2011 
could indicate that “buying support” strategy may have limited success.  
Obviously, in a cross-country study demand for democratization is difficult to measure explic-
itly. One approach could be associated with survey techniques directly or indirectly asking 
about satisfaction with and preference for democracy, which have been actively applied for 
various countries and cross-country samples (e.g. Bratton and Mattes 2001; Inglehart 2003; 
Evans and Whitfield 2009; among others). An alternative could be to attempt to infer the “re-Are Human Rights and Economic Well-Being Substitutes?  
Evidence from Migration Patterns across the Indian States 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 163  5 
 
vealed preferences” from public behavior, assuming a certain level of consistency of individ-
ual decisions. Minier (2001) attempts to do so  by looking  at the pro-democratic political 
movements, and concludes that the probability of their occurrence in non-democracies does 
increase with income, but up to a certain threshold. However, even this variable partly reflects 
not just the demand, but also the political pressure preventing democratic movements to oc-
cur. However, while the major part of the literature in this endeavor focuses on the democrati-
zation studying the “voice”, i.e. political activity within a country or a sub-national jurisdic-
tion, there is an alternative factor to be taken into account: the “exit”, or the movement of the 
population between countries and regions determined by the economic and political differ-
ences.  
In this case the preferences of individuals are “revealed” through their migration decision, 
which may take democracy into account (or ignore it). One could question the “power” of 
exist to influence the democratic transition (although many autocracies, most prominently the 
Soviet Union in the 1970-1980s, have been concerned with the threats of emigration); there 
are also additional complexities caused by the interaction of “voice” and “exit” (Hugh-Jones 
2007)  and  further  effects  of  interjurisdictional  competition  on  economic  policy  (Vanberg 
2000). However, if the key question is the demand for democracy, looking at the “exit” deci-
sions may be valuable. Unlike “voice”, “exit” is rarely “strategic” in a sense that migrants 
expect their country of destination (or origin) to change through their migration decision. In 
some cases people do migrate with explicit willingness to “change” their target country, as it 
has been, for example, for the European colonists in North America or for the early Jewish 
migration to Palestine and Israel. However, in many cases one is safe to say that migrants take 
the economic and political conditions at their destination “as given” and expect them to re-
main unchanged independent on the migration flows.
1   
On the one hand, as “voice” in the struggle for democracy, “exit” is associated with costs 
(both unavoidably caused by migration – transportation, learning, adjustments to the new cul-
tural environment etc. – and also determined by the restrictive policies of the domestic and 
foreign countries), which the individuals may be facing in their choice of the “optimal” coun-
try of residence. Thus, controlling for these costs and further characteristics of the countries, 
one should be able to observe the relative importance of democracy and other factors (for ex-
ample, economic well-being) for the migration decisions and infer the demand for democracy. 
In many cases, however, migration is also influenced by the “pressures” of the “supply side” 
of political regimes: both in the country of origin (through restrictions on exit) and in the tar-
get country (through immigration rules). In most developed countries immigration from the 
developing world (which in many cases represents the movement of the population from the 
non-democracies to democracies) is severely restricted. The movement from developed to 
developing countries, on the other hand, is very small, what may be caused (and most likely is 
caused) by both income gap and gap in political liberties. Legal restrictions (and the opportu-
nity to avoid them) may cause serious frictions in the migration flows. 
However, if one were able to find a setting where the governments had no direct means of 
restricting migration and, on the other hand, there were significant differences in the political 
regimes and civil liberties, one could indeed hope that the migration flows represent the pure 
“demand for democracy” controlling for other factors. Although in the international environ-
                                                 
1 Even more, migrants could under-estimate the strategic consequences of migration on their target and origin 
countries.  Are Human Rights and Economic Well-Being Substitutes? 
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ment this setup is obviously absent (integrated areas like the EU or US-Canada are homoge-
nous in terms of their political regimes), one could be interested to consider the intra-national 
movements of the population and political regime variation. On the one hand, although many 
countries impose intra-national restrictions on the free movement of people, they are rarely as 
severe as though routinely created on the international level (and if they are, there are usually 
strong enforcement gaps). On the other hand, while it has been rarely studied in economics, 
the political regimes of most countries exhibit a significant level of internal political differen-
tiation: for most federations in the developing world “isles of autocracy” or more democratic 
jurisdictions are rather rule than an exception. Examples studied in the literature include most 
Latin American countries (Brazil, Mexico and Argentina), but also Russia and India (see in-
troduction to McMann (2006) for a survey). Even in the developed world the existence of 
variations in the level of democracy within a state are not rare (Gel’man 2010). Hence, under 
these conditions one could infer the demand for democracy by observing the movement of the 
population. In addition, the intra-national heterogeneity regarding other factors, although pos-
sibly high, is certainly lower than on the international level; hence, it may be possible to ex-
pect lower impact on the confounding factors of the unobserved heterogeneity from the eco-
nometric perspective and also lower costs of migration, which would allow the preferences 
for democracy and civil liberties to manifest themselves more clearly (see also general discus-
sion in Snyder 2001).
2 
This paper is an attempt to apply this strategy by analyzing the determinants of the migration 
flows across the Indian states. There are several factors explaining the choice of the case 
study. Given a significant differentiation in terms of income levels across India, there may be 
a strong economic rational determining the migration. However, in addition, there does exist a 
variation of Indian states in terms of power balance in local political systems (Harris 1999), 
electoral accountability (Besley and Burgess 2002), human right violations (Beer and Mitchell 
2006), and even politico-economic systems (the example of the state of West Bengal ruled by 
the Communist party for several decades is illustrative from this point of view, see Chen and 
Sil 2007).
3 Thus, we obtain substantial variation of both explanatory variables we are inter-
ested is, which makes the study possible. A decisive argument in favor of India is that this 
country is not just characterized by a variation of sub-national political regimes, but also pro-
vides us with quantitative variables making the measurement of these regimes possible – a 
feature, once again, absent in many federations with regional variation of political systems. A 
further argument in favor of of the Indian case is that we also have information on the intra-
national cross-regional migration: these data are unavailable for many developing countries 
(for which the question of variation of sub-national political systems is relevant).  
In this paper we go for a rather narrow aspect of democracy, looking merely at the protection 
of the human rights. The choice of this variable is motivated by two factors. First, the quanti-
                                                 
2 A further often occurring problem is that the democracy and well-being in international samples are correlated 
and attract migrants – particularly, the OECD countries. There is of course also partly significant voluntarily 
migration to the non-democratic countries, like Russia and UAE, yet the problem is more significant than on 
the sub-national level, where the association between human rights and income is not so clear and, what is 
even more important, is not perceived in an unambiguous fashion by the migrants as in the international sam-
ples. 
3 Many aspects of this variation are informal, i.e. related rather to political practices then to written law; how-
ever, the significant role of informal differences is also typical for cross-country comparison of political re-
gimes (where non-democracies often “imitate” formal institutions of democracy without accepting their con-
tent). Are Human Rights and Economic Well-Being Substitutes?  
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tative data on human rights violations in Indian states are available and have been reported by 
a federal institution (National Human Rights Commission), what makes the values for indi-
vidual states more reliable. Even more important, looking just at one aspect makes the theo-
rizing about the “demand for human rights” somewhat easier, since it removes several addi-
tional uncertainties associated with the broader concepts of “democratization”. One should 
bear in mind that the willingness of individuals to “give up” basic human rights “in exchange” 
for economic wealth is likely to be smaller than for, for example, political freedoms (e.g. right 
to vote),
4 since human rights violations directly affect the everyday life of each individual and 
can be extremely costly. Thus, we subject the possibility of a substitution relation between 
(this aspect of) democracy and economic well-being to an “extreme case” test.  
The findings of this paper suggest that the human rights and economic well-being can in some 
sense be perceived as substitutes by the migrants – and that at least in the Indian case the im-
pact of the economic conditions is somewhat more robust. We show that rich states attract 
migrants almost regardless of the human rights; on the other hand, the reduction of number of 
human rights violations matters only if the target state of migration is poor; if the income per 
capita goes up, negative effects of human rights violations on migration are absent. Thus, our 
results cautiously suggest that in some sense the “exchanging the growth for human rights 
strategy” implemented by some autocrats in the world and aspired by even a larger number of 
dictators may work.  
This paper is related to two literatures. The first is, as mentioned, the studies of the impact of 
economic modernization on democratization. The second (surprisingly small one) looks at the 
impact of democracy on the international migration. Several papers so far have looked at the 
role of democracy and human rights for the international migration flows. Karemera et al. 
(2000) for the immigration to North America show that the deficit of democracy in the origin 
country strengthens emigration, and Solimano (2003) for Argentina, reversely, that the deficit 
of democracy discourages immigration. Narayan and Smyth (2005) for the time series for Fiji 
demonstrate  that  in  the  long  run  both  changes  in  income  and  in  the  level  of  democracy 
granger-cause migration, though the effect is difficult to interpret. Rotte and Vogler (1998) for 
Germany and Acupan and Agbola (2007) for the Philippines focus their attention on the nega-
tive consequences of the non-democratic regimes creating barriers for emigration, yet this is 
exactly the dimension we hope to exclude by looking at a sub-national sample. However, to 
our knowledge, no research has been done on the interaction of income and various aspects of 
democracy (including human rights) as potential driving forces for the migration – hence, this 
paper could fill this gap.
5 Furthermore, while there has been some (rather old) research pub-
lished  on  the  determinants  of  migration  between  Indian  states  (Greenwood  1971),  to  our 
knowledge, no papers so far have explored the comparative analysis of economic and political 
determinants of migration. 
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents our main model and data; section 3 summa-
rizes the key results; section 4 reports the main robustness checks; and section 5 extends our 
analysis by taking linguistic and geographic distance between Indian states into account and 
looking at non-linear effects of income and human rights. Section 6, finally, concludes. 
                                                 
4 For a individual aware of the low probability of being pivotal in mass elections or the “swing voter curse” 
(Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996), decision to give up voting rights could actually be rational.  
5 Obviously, human rights violations have a certain effect on the refugee migration (Schmeidl 1997), yet it is 
outside of the scope of this paper. Are Human Rights and Economic Well-Being Substitutes? 
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2  Model and data 
Basically, we estimate a gravity equation for the inter-state migration in India. The dependent 
variable is the number of migrants from one state to another. The data on the interregional 
migration has been published by the Institute of Applied Manpower Research as a cross-
section for migration between 15 larger states in 1999-2000. That gives us more than 200 in-
dividual data points, thus making statistical analysis feasible. Unfortunately, the data is avail-
able only for a subset of Indian states and territories; what is a certain limitation of our analy-
sis. However, 15 states included in our study cover the lion’s share of the Indian territory. The 
only large state not included in this study is Jammu and Kashmir, which obviously is signifi-
cantly different from the rest of India due to the Indo-Pakistani conflict. Figure 1 represents 
the states covered by our analysis. 
We regress the migration flow from state A to state B on economic characteristics of both 
states, political characteristics of both states and their interaction terms. There are also a num-
ber of control variables.  In order to account for the magnitude of the migration, we always 
include the population of both target and origin states as reported in the 2001 census. A fur-
ther control included in all regressions is the geographical distance, measured as the highway 
distance between two state capitals.
6 In a number of specifications we also control for the 
common language as a factor of migration, as well as for the interaction between the linguistic 
and the geographical proximity. Language is extremely important for India due to high het-
erogeneity of this country. The linguistic proximity is captured by a dummy, which is equal to 
one if both states belong to the same linguistic group and zero otherwise. The groups we ap-
ply in this paper are the simplest possible ones: we divide India into the Indoaryan and the 
Dravid zones.
7 (and also use a different methodology as a robustness check, as it will be re-
ported in what follows). 
 
                                                 
6  We acknowledge the fact that for large distances in India railroad distance could be more appropriate, how-
ever, for short and medium distances highway transportation dominates; both distance measures ought to be 
highly correlated and hence have little impact on our results. 
7 Of course, once again, it simplifies issues, since the linguistic and ethnic differentiation in India goes far be-
yond that, however, still reflects a certain level of cultural and linguistic proximity between states, which is 
likely to influence the migration behavior. Further disaggregation will most likely lead to declaring each state 
a separate “language zone”, thus making the analysis impossible (and indirectly assuming that the differences 
between states are so large that there should be no linguistic effects in the interstate migration whatsoever). 
Some states are considered as belonging to both Indoaryan and Dravid linguistic zones. Are Human Rights and Economic Well-Being Substitutes?  
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Figure 1: Territory of India covered by our analysis (states included in the study are marked grey) 
In order to check for the economic dimension, we include the income per capita of the target 
state and the origin state into account. The political dimension is captured through control-
ling for the number of human rights violations complaints coming from each state, as reported 
by the Human Rights Commission. This variable is, of course, not flawless: for instance, the 
number of complaints does not necessarily coincide with the actual human rights violations 
(and, even more, can be reported strategically, for example, if the complaints procedure as 
such is costly or if the government of the state can influence the reporting). However, it seems 
to be an interesting way to analyze the sub-national political variation between Indian states, 
which has also been used in the literature (see Beer and Mitchell 2006). As the Figure 2 
shows, the variables are somewhat correlated (high income associated with a lower number of 
violations), but the correlation is not too large to make an econometric study impossible due 
to the multicollinearity problem.  
 Are Human Rights and Economic Well-Being Substitutes? 
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Figure 2: Human rights violations and income per capita of Indian states. Note: Uttar Pradesh excluded 
(an extremely high number of the human rights violations reported) 
 
The main estimation is done in the OLS; we will, however, use the TSLS estimator to solve 
the problem of endogeneity, when it arises, as it will be discussed in what follows. There are 
also several further robustness checks and modifications to the specification, as well as differ-
ent estimation techniques, which will be presented in the next section. The details on the data-
set and the summary statistics are included in Appendix A.  
 
3  Main results 
The main results of the estimation are reported in Table 1. Consider first the role of political 
and economic determinants of migration. Without the interaction term, the results seem to be 
straightforward: migration is driven exclusively by the economic considerations and, specifi-
cally, those of the target state (origin state does not matter). Richer states seem to act as 
“magnets” attracting the mobile labor force. Human rights violations are insignificant (speci-
fication (2)). The situation changes dramatically, however, if one includes the interaction ef-
fect in the regressions (specifications (3) and (4)). In this case it is the income per capita, 
which is insignificant; one obtains a significant and negative effect of the human rights viola-
tions in the target state and a positive and significant interaction term. So, from that point of 
view it looks like human rights violations and economic performance act, at least, to some 
degree, as substitutes.  
The effect becomes more clear, if one takes into account the fact that in the regressions with 
interaction terms standard errors are also different across the sample and plots the marginal Are Human Rights and Economic Well-Being Substitutes?  
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effects of the income conditional on the human rights violations and human rights violations 
conditional on income as determinants of migration flows (for the specification (3)). Figure 3 
represents the marginal effect of the human rights violations. As one can clearly see, the effect 
is almost always significant; if the level of income per capita in the target state is small, large 
number of human rights violations has a strong negative effect on the immigration. If income 
goes up, the effect becomes smaller and eventually insignificant; however, for very high in-
come one in fact observes even a positive effect of the human rights violations on the migra-
tion inflow. This is an interesting observation, which requires a further discussion. On the one 
hand, it is possible that one simply deals with a statistical artifact (resulting from the distribu-
tion of the variables), which should not be over-interpreted. On the other hand, it is also pos-
sible that a large number of human rights violations is interpreted differently for rich and poor 
states. In a rich state large number of reported violations could in fact indicate a better protec-
tion of human rights from the respective institutions, which could be more active or devoted 
to their task. Then a positive effect observed in the data is clear. In the poor states, on the con-
trary, large number of violations seems to be interpreted in the “direct” sense as worse protec-
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Figure 3: Marginal effects of the human rights violations conditional on income per capita in the target state 
 
Anyway, a rich state seems to be able to “afford” to violate human rights and still be attractive 
for migrants. As for the conditional effect of the income (Figure 4), it is almost always posi-
tive and significant; so, in this case economic factors have a positive impact on migration re-
                                                 
8 Since the state of Uttar Pradesh is an outlier in our sample with a very large number of the violations of human 
rights, we have also re-estimated all regressions (1)-(4) without this state, and found identical effects.  Are Human Rights and Economic Well-Being Substitutes? 
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gardless of the situation with the human rights. To conclude, human rights do matter for mi-










Figure 4: Marginal effects of the income conditional on human rights violations in the target state 
 
We also expand our analysis by looking at further confounding factors. Particularly, we re-
estimate specifications (3) and (4) adding as further controls unemployment (pet 1000 people) 
in both target and origin states. Labor market is obviously an extremely important factor of 
domestic migration (as well as of the international one). Our main results (for the human 
rights violations and their interaction term for the target state) do not change, however, prov-
ing the robustness of our findings.
10 
One could argue that it is not entirely correct to treat the dependent variable in our regressions 
as continuous. As a matter of fact, migration represents a discrete decision by an individual, 
and therefore the dependent variable is rather a count variable (although very large number of 
migrants makes the treatment of this variable possibly appropriate). It means that the OLS 
may be non-applicable for the problem of this paper. That is why we also re-estimated our 
model using negative binomial regressions (Table 2, regression 8). A disadvantage of this 
approach is that the interaction terms, which are central for our analysis, face significant diffi-
                                                 
9 One should point out that we control for population of both states anyway, so our main results show the effect 
of human rights  violations increase  for a constant population (ceteris paribus). However, as a robustness 
check, we replace total number of human rights violations by the human rights violations per capita (and also 
construct a respective interaction term). In this specification (regression (3)) we obtain significant and positive 
effect of human rights violations in the origin state, and significant and negative effect of the interaction term 
for the origin state. Thus, we once again confirm the substitution relation between human rights and well-
being, just not for the target, but for the origin state – our main message remains unchanged.  
10 Data for unemployment are for 1999-2000 and have been published by the Indian official statistics in the NSS 
report no.455. Are Human Rights and Economic Well-Being Substitutes?  
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culties in terms of interpretation, if non-linear estimation techniques are used (Ai and Norman 
2003). Nevertheless, the significances and the signs of the coefficients relevant for our study 
do not change, so there are at least no obvious contradictions to our findings.
11  
 
4  Robustness checks 
4.1  Specifications of gravity model 
In what follows we report a number of robustness checks for our main findings. We concen-
trate ourselves to the discussion of main effects of Table 1. The first modification is based on 
the adjustments of the gravity model. Our initial gravity model has been mostly empiristic in 
nature, and thus ignored several problems actively debated particularly in the international 
trade literature, where this type of modeling found its key application. As the first step, we 
introduce in our models the remoteness index, which is based on the need to account for the 
relative attractiveness of each origin-destination pair. In the trade literature remoteness index 
is defined for each country i as its “average” income-weighted distance to and from all other 









where d is distance, and Y either income (for remoteness based on income) or human rights 
violations (for remoteness based on human rights violations). In our case, since the model 
looks at two possible sources of “gravity” (income and human rights), in the first modification 
we  apply,  respectively,  two  remoteness  indicators:  one  income-weighted  and  one  human 
rights-weighted. We have calculated these two indicators and added them to our regressions. 
As the results for the specifications (5) to (7) show, the interaction terms and the human rights 
violations indicators hold their sign and significance.  
However, the remoteness index has also been actively criticized for being a highly question-
able  and  primarily  a-theoretical  measure  of  what  should  be  called  multilateral  resistance. 
There are several approaches to modeling multilateral resistance in the literature. One implies 
on structural modeling and estimation of the non-linear models: this is problematic for us, 
since it would involve very strong theoretical assumptions on migrants’ behavior regarding 
well-being and human rights (which we, unlike the trade studies, cannot borrow from the lit-
erature). Some more recent work (Baier and Bergstrand 2009) also suggest a different ap-
proach, which adds to the state-specific multilateral resistance a further effect of a “world 
resistance” in a way allowing estimating the regressions using simple OLS (in this case re-
                                                 
11 We also estimated a Poisson regression, and obtained significant and negative effect of the number of human 
rights violation in the target state and significant and positive interaction term (hence, the result at least does 
not contradict our expectations). However, the goodness-of-the-fit test  is  highly significant indicating the 
presence of over-dispersion; hence, using the negative binomial estimator is appropriate. Are Human Rights and Economic Well-Being Substitutes? 
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ferred to as BV-OLS).. This is the approach which will be employed in what follows. For this 
purpose we first transform our model in a way usual in the international trade gravity regres-
sions by taking logs of all dependent and independent variables (with the exception of com-
mon language dummy), and replacing the interaction terms between original variables by the 
interaction terms between logs (Table 2, specification 11).
12 The results completely confirm 
our previous regressions, although the interpretation of the conditional marginal effects is 
more difficult with logs.
13 In the next step we modify the variables representing migration 
costs (distance, common language dummy and their product) in line with the BV-OLS ap-
proach of Baier and Bergstrand (2009). Specifically, after correction for the multilateral and 
world trade resistance, each costs variable bij is defined as: 



















b b 2 , 
where N is the number of states in our analysis. Our results, however, remain robust (specifi-
cation 12). 
 
4.2  Spatial autocorrelation 
A recent development in the analysis of gravity models involves using the tools of spatial 
econometrics. The advantage is that this approach allows taking spatial interdependence in the 
flows into account. This is also an estimation approach we look at in this paper as a further 
robustness check. For the spatial econometrics specifications the key element is the definition 
of the distance matrix. We follow LeSage and Pace (2008) in this respect. They suggest using 
the following approach: first, one presents the data in the “origin-centric way” (i.e. sorted ac-
cording to the origin state and then destination state). Then for n states one constructs a matrix 
W containing inverse distances (in our dataset we can use the standard highway distances to 
the power of minus one
14). For the gravity equations (where one has n
2 observations of the 
dependent variable with n number of states in our sample) we apply one of three spatial ma-
trices:  the  “origin-based”  matrix W In ⊗ ,  the  “destination-based”  matrix  n I W ⊗   and  the 
combination of those  W W ⊗ .  
Thus, we proceed as follows. First, we add to our sample 15 observations, corresponding to 
pairs of states A and B, where A and B coincide (this is necessary for the reasonable applica-
tion of the spatial matrix described above). We set migration for all these pairs equal to zero, 
as well as distance. Simply re-estimating regression (3) for this sample still yields a signifi-
cant and negative impact of human rights violations in the target state and significant and pos-
                                                 
12 We also use the simplest possible approach and drop the observations for the state pairs with zero migration 
and with zero distance (e.g. capitals directly in front of each other).  
13 On the other hand, a concave transformation (like that using logs) is helpful to assess the impact of outliers on 
our analysis, which seems to be marginal or absent.  
14 For the states Haryana and Punjab, which have capitals located in the immediate vicinity of each other, we set 
the entry of the matrix to be equal to 1, i.e. larger than for all other dyads of states. Are Human Rights and Economic Well-Being Substitutes?  
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itive interaction term. Then we re-estimate the regression applying each of three spatial matri-
ces defined above. In each case we estimate both spatial lag and spatial error models (thus one 
obtains six regressions overall).
15 However, we find no changes in terms of sign and signifi-
cance for the variables we are interested in. Both spatial lag and spatial error (ρ and λ) terms 
are insignificant regardless of the spatial matrix we use. Therefore one can conclude that our 
results are robust to incorporating in the regressions further forms of spatial interdependence. 
 
4.3  Endogeneity 
So far the analysis ignored the potential endogeneity problems in the estimation. While the 
geographical distance is clearly exogenous, and the reverse causality problem for the popula-
tion and language are unlikely to be very pronounced (even the largest migration flows do not 
affect population of the Indian states in a way that it changes significantly and, specifically, 
changes its linguistic composition – the Indoaryan and the Dravid zones have remained in the 
present shape almost for millennia), the reverse causality is obviously possible for the eco-
nomic  and  political  variables.  Hence,  it  becomes  necessary  to  apply  the  two-stage  least 
squares techniques and to look for the instrumental variables. The results of the TSLS are 
reported in Table 2, specifications (9) and (10), instrumenting for the income per capita, hu-
man rights violations and their product in both states. As the instruments we use the lagged 
income of the year 1990-1991, the share of the population participating in the federal elec-
tions (Lok sabha elections), as well as number and share of literate individuals in both states 
and their various products (necessary to capture the interaction terms; details are reported in 
note to Table 2).  
 
                                                 
15 Results are available on request Are Human Rights and Economic Well-Being Substitutes? 
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Table 1: Determinants of interstate migration in India, 1999-2000, dep. var.: number of migrants from one state 
















Income per capita origin  -1.116  -0.831  2.088  0.416  -2.078  -4.101  -4.853 
  (2.159)  (2.235)  (2.702)  (2.667)  (2.823)  (3.390)  (3.225) 
Income  per capita target  10.662***  10.597***  -0.695  -2.368  -5.090  -4.653  -6.081 
  (2.882)  (2.728)  (3.397)  (3.200)  (3.472)  (3.749)  (3.800) 
Hurman rights violations origin    6.486  23.761  14.089  5.523  -6.772  -8.509 
    (4.586)  (17.767)  (17.139)  (17.804)  (17.794)  (17.708) 
Human rights violations target    -1.356  -68.605**  -78.276***  -87.830***  -88.307***  -92.581*** 
    (3.826)  (28.146)  (27.148)  (28.653)  (31.348)  (31.448) 
Income  *  Human  rights  viola-
tions origin      -0.002  -0.001  -0.000  0.001  0.001 
      (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Income  *  Human  rights  viola-
tions target      0.007**  0.008***  0.009***  0.009***  0.009*** 
      (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Common language        408,840.937***  351,724.775***  318,987.975***  298,423.052*** 
        (75,088.503)  (72,065.967)  (72,619.014)  (70,611.107) 
Geographical distance  -111.815***  -113.906***  -109.877***  55.457*  0.689  2.879  -24.047 
  (15.739)  (15.554)  (16.170)  (28.771)  (28.407)  (30.002)  (29.017) 
Common  language  dummy  * 
distance        -193.162***  -162.984***  -149.023***  -137.441*** 
        (33.116)  (32.192)  (31.877)  (30.910) 
Population origin  0.002**  0.001  0.001*  0.001**  0.001***  0.002***  0.002*** 
  (0.001)  (0.00)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Population target  0.002***  0.002**  0.001*  0.001**  0.002**  0.002**  0.002** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Remoteness income origin          98,108.696***    51,660.670 
          (28,780.559)    (35,900.144) 
Remoteness income target          104,338.598***    89,585.463*** 
          (35,308.688)    (32,839.844) 
Remoteness human rights origin            10,860.948***  9,746.360** 
            (3,772.576)  (4,312.763) 
Remoteness human rights target            6,316.554**  3,744.430 
            (3,120.763)  (3,034.849) 
Constant  -61,665.146  -29,828.598  84,422.632  -268,170.667**  -435,004.309***  -718,604.825***  -738,329.356*** 
  (112,113.975)  (107,739.339)  (81,207.265)  (121,320.065)  (139,139.341)  (194,444.625)  (197,152.754) 
No. obs.  210  210  210  210  210  210  210 
No. states  15  15  15  15  15  15  15 
R
2  0.383  0.398  0.43  0.464  0.488  0.497  0.509 
 
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** signifi-
cant at 1% level.  
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Table 2: Determinants of interstate migration in India, 1999-2000, robustness checks, dep. var.: number of mi-












Income per capita origin  0.000  7.055  1.164  2.609  1.511 
  (0.000)  (11.849)  (11.837)  (2.485)  (2.344) 
Income per capita target  0.000  4.044  1.701  -2.574  -3.961* 
  (0.000)  (3.726)  (3.586)  (2.470)  (2.384) 
Hurman rights violations origin  0.000  50.184  17.877  3.570  2.252 
  (0.000)  (68.321)  (67.841)  (3.084)  (2.884) 
Human rights violations target  -0.000***  -49.797*  -63.369**  -5.121*  -6.759** 
  (0.000)  (27.821)  (27.776)  (3.009)  (2.881) 
Income * Human rights violations origin  -0.000*  -0.005  -0.001  -0.375  -0.217 
  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.328)  (0.306) 
Income * Human rights violations target  0.000***  0.005*  0.006**  0.549*  0.740** 
  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.321)  (0.306) 
Common language  2.569***  -10,609.414  423,997.589***  14.448*  3.691 
  (0.917)  (27,464.202)  (77,914.649)  (7.969)  (9.080) 
Geographical distance  -0.000  -114.765***  60.819*  -0.455  -2.021* 
  (0.000)  (19.707)  (35.473)  (1.031)  (1.188) 
Common language dummy * distance  -0.001***    -197.986***  -1.900*  -0.505 
  (0.000)    (35.814)  (1.043)  (1.180) 
Population origin  0.000***  0.001  0.001  0.810***  0.993*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.247)  (0.253) 
Population target  0.000***  0.002**  0.002***  1.301***  1.469*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.225)  (0.215) 
Constant  8.244***  -80,576.847  -382,649.885*  -26.152  -12.735 
  (1.118)  (218,164.828)  (204,196.415)  (31.112)  (30.661) 
No. obs.  210  210  210  200  200 
No. states  15  15  15  15  15 
R
2        0.646  0.647 
F-stat first stage (income origin)    216.74***  262.58***     
F-stat first stage (income target)    507.32***  540.36***     
F-stat first stage (human rights origin)    7.25***  8.28***     
F-stat first stage (human rights target)    17.91***  17.46***     
F-stat first stage (interaction term origin)    9.00***  9.93***     
F-stat first stage (interaction term target)    21.22***  20.41***     
Hansen J    4.590  2.431     
Logs  of  population,  migration,  distance, 
human rights violations  and income  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
 
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** signifi-
cant at 1% level. Instrumented variables are income per capita target and origin, human rights violations target 
and origin and respective interaction terms. Instruments are lagged income target and origin, share of participants 
of federal elections target and origin, number of literate individuals target and origin, product of income lagged 
and share of literate individuals target, of income lagged and share of participants at federal elections target, and 
share of literate individuals target 
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The logic of the instruments is the following. As for the lagged income, the approach is 
straightforward and similar to what is often found in the literature. A 10-year lag seems to be 
appropriate to ensure exogeneity of instruments. The federal elections participation is chosen 
because of the following reasons: on the one hand, election participation as such is very likely 
to be correlated with the political regime in the region and, specifically, affect the ability of 
the state governments to violate the human rights (which is probably higher if the electorate is 
more passive). On the other hand, however, the participation in the federal elections should 
not be directly related to the migration decision: even if an individual declares her willingness 
to move to another state, she still remains within the jurisdiction of the federal government 
and therefore the decision to vote (or to not) on the federal level should remain the same. Fi-
nally, the literacy is among the strongest predictors of the human rights violations found in the 
literature (see Beer and Mitchell 2006).  The econometric properties of instruments are fine: 
they are not significant in the second stage, if included in the specification of regression (9), 
provide high F-statistics in the first stage (higher than 10 in most cases, and, particularly, for 
all  significant  variables),  and  the  Hansen  J  is  insignificant  suggesting  that  in  this  over-
identification scenario one can be sure that even if just one instrument is exogenous, all other 
are as well.  
Basically, the results reported confirm the predictions of the OLS estimations: all effects for 
the human rights violations and the income per capita survive. If one includes the common 
language dummy and the interaction term for this variable in the TSLS regressions, the results 
are still the same. Hence, one can at least hope that the results are unlikely to be driven by the 
reverse causality, although the usual caveats as for the imperfect instruments should be con-
sidered in this case as well. 
 
5  Extensions 
While the previous section has convincingly provided us with the main answer to the question 
this paper does explore (human rights violations can be substituted for income per capita, but 
income attracts migrants regardless of the human rights violations), it is possible that the 
shape of relation we have assumed so far is unable to capture the whole complexity of interre-
lations between two variables in question.  This is exactly the issue we are going to explore in 
this section. First, we will look at the substitution effect we established so far, and try to un-
derstand whether there are further non-linear effects observed in our sample. Second, we will 
closely examine the proxy for costs of migration introduced so far (i.e. distance and, partially, 
language dummy) and introduce several modifications in this respect. 
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5.1  Non-linearity of income and human rights violations 
A possible modification of our analysis is to introduce further non-linearity in the impact of 
human rights and income on migration. It is possible, for instance, that the marginal effect of 
human rights violations on migration depends not just upon the income per capita in the state, 
but also upon the number of human rights violations themselves. Specifically, it is possible 
that the sensitivity to the human rights violations (or to the changes of income) depends upon 
the number of human rights violations individuals observe. For very few violations, for ex-
ample, people could simply “disregard” them and make their migration decision independent 
of the human rights situation (taking an international example, even if the, say, Sweden out-
performs Germany in terms of human rights protection, it is unlikely to matter for a migrant 
for a developing country choosing his target). On the other hand, the sensitivity could be lost 
for very large numbers of violations. Overall, these effects are likely to be present if migrants’ 
decisions are based on “general picture” and simplification of information, what is a reason-
able assumption from the behavioral economics point of view (where the fact that individuals 
“simplify” the information they obtain from the real world when they make decisions is a 
well-established fact).  
Unfortunately, in this case it is easy to lose the tractability of analysis; now both the marginal 
effects and the significance levels depend on two parameters (both income per capita and 
number of human rights violations reported). Furthermore, since our sample is not very large, 
it is possible that all effects we obtain are driven by a handful of states and thus we could end 
up over-interpreting our findings. Hence, we restrict ourselves to two modifications. Appendix 
B reports the quantitative findings; here we concentrate on graphical analysis of sign and sig-
nificance of the effect in line with Brambor et al. (2006). First, we introduce non-linearity in 
the human rights violations, keeping the effect of income per capita linear. Then the specifica-
tion include income per capita, human rights violations, square of human rights violations and 
the interaction terms between income and human rights violations and income and squared 
human rights violations. Main results are reported in Figures 5 and 6.  
Now we obtain significant effects (at least, partly) for both target and origin states. For the 
origin state, we report a significant and positive effect of human rights violations only for 
poor states and states with a small number of violations. Thus, first of all, human rights viola-
tions “push” migrants away only if the state is very poor, providing substantial evidence for 
the main claim of this paper. But, on the other hand, if the number of human rights violations 
is very large, they have no “push” effect. One could hypothesize that people “get used” to the 
human rights violations, which therefore do not support migration. Of course, one should be 
very cautious while generalizing this result for other countries: even the highest number of 
human rights violations in India is much lower than in some other parts of the world (but then 
one is entering the problem of refugee migration, which is, as mentioned, outside of the scope 
of this paper). As for the target state, we still find the effects reported in the previous section, 
but only for states where the number of human rights violations is high enough. Otherwise, 
the effect is reversed. For very poor states with a very small number of violations one actually 
obtains a positive marginal effect, but this effect should be present only for states with the 
number human rights violations reported below ca. 1000 and income per capita below roughly 
10,000 INR, and there is not a single state in our sample satisfying these conditions; we are 
dealing with purely counterfactual evidence, which should be treated with extreme caution. A 
more reliable piece of evidence is that a marginal increase of human rights violations in states, Are Human Rights and Economic Well-Being Substitutes? 
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which are relatively rich and have reported very few violations before, is likely to “scare” 
migrants. Once again, it is not surprising: it may be related to “overly optimistic” expectations 
migrants have regarding these states, which therefore suffer severely  even for very small 
number of violations. 
Another specification we test includes the squared income per capita (and the respective inter-
action terms). Figures 7 and 8 summarize our findings. For the target and the origin state the 
effect of income per capita in terms of sign and significance never depends upon the level of 
human rights violations; our main claim about the substitution effect going only one way is 
therefore supported. For the target state we find that income per capita attracts migrants only 
if it is high enough (and there is no effect if income per capita is relatively small). It may re-
flect the cognitive biases we have discussed above: smaller variations in income are ignored 
by the migrants. In the same way, for the origin state the negative effect of income (the larger 
the income, the smaller the migration) is present only for states which are sufficiently poor. 
For very rich states we get an even (marginally significant) positive effect of income on mi-
gration, but this effect is driven just by three states in our sample and may be associated, for 
instance, with the fact that in rich states mobility of people is higher (recall that we do not 
distinguish temporary and permanent migration).  
Therefore,  almost  all  our  results  clearly  survive  the  introduction  of  further  non-linearity. 
However, they seem to be driven by particular segments of our sample; the sensitivity of peo-
ple to changes in human rights and income is indeed different depending upon whether their 
level is high or low.  Are Human Rights and Economic Well-Being Substitutes?  
Evidence from Migration Patterns across the Indian States 
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Figure 5: Marginal effects of the human rights violations conditional on income per capita and the initial level of 
human rights violations in the target state, specification (C2) 
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Figure 6: Marginal effects of the human rights violations conditional on income per capita and the initial level of 
human rights violations in the origin state, specification (C2) 
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Figure 7: Marginal effects of the income per capita conditional on human rights violations and the initial level of 
income per capita violations in the target state, specification (C4) 
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Figure 8: Marginal effects of the income per capita conditional on human rights violations and the initial level of 
income per capita violations in the origin state, specification (C4) 
5.2  Migration and the linguistic factors 
One of the key reasons for choosing a sub-national sample for our analysis was, beyond the 
absence of severe internal migration restrictions, limited heterogeneity of unobserved factors 
associated with the migration costs. India is, however, an example of a country with very 
strong internal cultural and ethnic differences: in a society still under way to the moderniza-
tion it may actually create a significant limitation to the migration flows. In addition, India is 
also a large country in terms of territory, what, combined with the imperfect quality of trans-
portation infrastructure, can also increase the costs of internal mobility. One has to control for 
both factors while establishing the results of this paper. Furthermore, geographical distance Are Human Rights and Economic Well-Being Substitutes?  
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and language as such may interact with each other as determinants of migration. This is an 
interesting question we want to approach in this section.
16 
To start with, if one does not control for language, geographical distance has an expected 
strong and significant negative impact on the migration flows. Simply adding the common 
language dummy does not change the result, and the common language remains insignificant. 
However, if one simultaneously adds the common language dummy and the interaction term, 
once again, the outcomes of the regressions differ dramatically. In the specification (4) of 
Table 1 the geographical distance just marginally significant and even positive. Language 
dummy is positive, highly significant and very large in quantitative terms (belonging to the 
same  linguistic  zone  adds  ceteris  paribus  another  400  thousand  migrants  to  the  interstate 
flows). Finally, the interaction term is highly significant and negative. Thus, one can claim 
that the language does increase the migration flows between states, but only if they are rela-
tively close to each other geographically. The result is robust to various controls (see Appen-
dix C); we obtain the same sign and significance in negative binomial (once again, with im-
portant caveats mentioned above). The analysis of the marginal effects is in fact even more 
interesting: as soon as the distance goes up, the effect of the language decreases and eventu-
ally becomes even negative and significant (see Figure C1 in the Appendix C).
17 
Our main goal remains, however, to look at whether language does somehow influence the 
interaction between the political and economic factors. It is possible, for instance, that the 
perception of politics and economy is somehow “clouded” or “made clearer” through the 
presence of common culture and language. Indeed, if one includes further interaction terms 
between language, income and human rights, they are quite often significant, though the re-
sults change somewhat over different specifications. In order to make the correct inference, 
we include the “full” set of all pairwise and triple interaction terms (see Brambor et al., 2006) 
and plot the conditional marginal effects for origin and target states and for states within the 
same linguistic zone and between different zones (Figure 9). There are no significant results, 
with just one exception: we once again obtain conditional effect of migration almost identical 
to Figure 3 for the target state, but only for the migrants within the same linguistic zone. 
Thus, human rights matter only for (probably) relatively less costly migration decisions with-
in the same linguistic zone; moving to different zone; if costs of migration are very high, mi-
grants ignore the aspect of human rights. However, one should not over-interpret these results, 
since they are not stable to a different definition of the common linguistic zones.
18 So, the 
cautious interpretation should be that the migration costs incurred by cultural differences do 
affect the “weighting” of the “own” and “foreign” human rights violations in the decision of 
the migrant, but the exact effect is not robust. 
                                                 
16 The role of linguistic and cultural proximity as a factor supporting migration has been well established in the 
literature (see e.g. Belot and Ederveen 2005 or Fafchamps and Shilpi 2009). 
17 As a further robustness check we apply a different linguistic map of India, which comes from Compare Info-
base. Here we basically split the Dravid zone into different linguistic units (usually encompassing just one 
state), as well as replace the Indoaryan zone by the explicit Hindu zone (which is smaller). The rule is that the 
states are attributed to the same zone if at least 25% of the population of each state speak the same language 
(however, most of them have a clear linguistic majority of more than 70%). There are however no qualitative 
changes in our results (Table C1), though the quantitative size of some effects shifts a little (although the 
overall economic significance of the common language effect is unchanged).  Are Human Rights and Economic Well-Being Substitutes? 
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Figure 9: Marginal effects of the human rights violations on the inter-state migration for identical or different 
linguistic zones, controlling for common language and its interaction with distance) 
6  Conclusion 
The objective of the study was by looking at the migration flows between Indian states to ex-
amine the substitution relation between the demand for human rights and for economic well-
being.  We have shown that high income works fine substituting for human rights in the eyes 
of the migrants; human rights matter only if they cannot be over-compensated by income. The 
opposite is not true: effect of income is independent of the human rights (at least in terms of 
sign and significance). Our findings have been sustained in the instrumental variable estima-
tion, suggesting the limited impact of reverse causality, and also in a number of further modi-
fications adjusting for modern approaches to the gravity modeling. The effect is influenced by 
                                                                                                                                                         
18 Using the definition from the previous footnote, we find significant negative effect of the number of violations 
on migration for small income and significant positive effect for large income in the target state only for the 
migration into a different linguistic zone. Are Human Rights and Economic Well-Being Substitutes?  
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the linguistic differences between states, but, if it remains significant, it is qualitatively the 
same. Furthermore, we find that the effects of human rights violations on migration depend 
also upon the level of human rights violations themselves: people “get used” to high number 
of violations (which therefore do not act as “push” factors) and are more sensitive to increase 
of violations in rich states, where originally no violations have been reported. In the same 
way, the “pushing” effect of low income is present only in poor states, and “pulling” effect of 
high income in rich states; however, the effect of income in terms of sign and significance 
never depends on the number of human rights violations. 
Thus, our study suggests that an exchange of well-being for human rights may in fact be at-
tractive for the people. Using human rights, as discussed can be interpreted as an “extreme 
case test”, since this is probably an aspect of democracy an “ordinary” citizen can appreciate 
most and will be most unlikely to give up. It makes our findings particularly strong. It is im-
portant to clearly indicate the place of our work in the existing literature. It does not contradict 
the well-established result that more stable democracies are observed in rich countries. We 
merely claim that if facing a choice between the advancements of democracy and economic 
well-being people could decide to “sacrifice” human rights. Therefore in rich countries, where 
this trade-off is absent, democracy has higher chances of survival. In poor countries, on the 
other hand, democratic consolidation will face significant difficulties, as will the mobilization 
for  democracy  in  fast-growing  and/or  rich  autocracies.  Once  again,  democratic  transition 
could be caused by the bargaining and fighting over rents and resources rather than “prefer-
ences” for democracy (as it has been quite often observed in oligarchic societies “slowly” 
moving towards enfranchising the majority of population and establishing better protection of 
property rights – the constitutional history of several European countries could serve as an 
example) and therefore be independent of preferences of individuals. However, the stability of 
these transitions may be questionable, and their voters may be more prone to support populist 
anti-democratic movements.   
The study acknowledges its limitations. First, two usual caveats should be mentioned: on the 
one hand, the external validity of any country-specific study can be doubted, and, on the other 
hand, the instrumentation strategy used is not flawless. As for the first remark, one should 
notice that in an international setting with the predominance of strict border controls in rich 
and democratic countries, interpreting the migration flows as a proxy for the “demand for 
democracy” is difficult: one may significantly under-estimate the preferences for democracy, 
or may face difficulties with disentangling demand for human rights and for economic well-
being. On the other hand, it is possible that our result hold just for relatively poor countries 
(as India), and in rich societies people will be ready to sacrifice part of their well-being for 
better protection of human rights (although one should recognize that the problem of choice 
between democracy and economic prosperity is more important for developing then for de-
veloped nations). Nevertheless, even under these restrictions the paper seems to generate in-
teresting observations, potentially contributing to the general discussion on the interrelation of 
democracy and economic growth. 
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Table A1: Description of variables 
Variables  Period  Definition  Source 
Common language  NA  A dummy variable which takes value 1 
when there is a common language be-
tween states and 0 otherwise. 
2001 Census Report   
Distance  NA  Highway  distance  between  the  capital 
cities of two states, km 
Mapsofindia official site. 
Human  rights  vio-
lations 
1999-2000  Number  of  Complaints  of  Human 
Rights Violation in a state 
Annual  Report,  National  Human 
Rights Commission  
Literacy  2001  Number of literate people in a state  Office of the Registrar General and 
Census Commissioner, India 
Migration  1999-2000  Number of people born in state A and 
who have been living in state B for less 
than a year. 
Institute  of  Applied  Manpower  Re-
search Yearbook 2003 
Participation  in 
federal elections 
1999  Share  of  the  eligible  individuals  par-
ticipating in the federal-level elections, 
% 
Statistical  Report  on  General  Elec-
tions  1999,  Vol.  1,  Election  Com-
mission of India 
Per capita income  1999-2000, 
1990-1991 
Average income a person receives in a 
state, INR 
Central  Statistical  Organisation, 
India 
Population  1999-2000  Total population of a state  2001 Census Report. 
Share of literate  2001  Number of literate per 1,000 people of 
the state’s population 
Office of the Registrar General and 
Census Commissioner, India 
 
Table A2: Summary statistics 
Variable  No. 
obs. 
Mean  St. dev.  Min  Max 
Common language  210  0.83  0.38  0.00  1.00 
Distance  210  1523.12  707.78  0.00  3426.00 
Human rights violations  210  2927.20  6495.91  178.00  26978.00 
Income per capita lagged  210  4932.60  1602.57  2660.00  8318.00 
Income per capita  210  16188.80  5389.82  5786.00  25631.00 
Literacy  210  33981640  17739030  12225040  77770270 
Migration  210  108762.90  204318.60  0.00  1617400.00 
Population  210  60176930  34687540  20382000  160851000 
Share of participants in the federal 
elections 
210  61.22  7.78  47.03  75.05 
Share of literate  210  538.51  91.85  397.78  812.74 
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Appendix B: Non-linear effects of income and human rights violations 
 
Table B1: Determinants of interstate migration in India, 1999-2000, dep. var.: number of migrants from one state 










Income per capita origin  6.317*  13.822**  -18.653  38.558 
  (3.267)  (5.346)  (14.145)  (23.797) 
Income per capita target  -0.736  18.004***  -9.995  37.767 
  (3.269)  (6.708)  (11.436)  (26.043) 
Income per capita squared origin      0.001  -0.001 
      (0.000)  (0.001) 
Income per capita squared target      0.000  -0.001 
      (0.000)  (0.001) 
Human rights origin  83.976**  231.729**  20.588  217.712** 
  (40.232)  (93.531)  (17.438)  (93.200) 
Human rights target  -68.486**  301.576**  -70.222**  94.253 
  (29.784)  (126.084)  (29.283)  (88.487) 
Human rights squared origin  -0.001*  -0.044     
  (0.001)  (0.028)     
Human rights squared target  -0.000  -0.106***     
  (0.000)  (0.039)     
Income per capita * Human rights origin  -0.004  -0.017**  -0.002  -0.031** 
  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.002)  (0.014) 
Income per capita * Human rights target  0.007***  -0.025**  0.007**  -0.017 
  (0.003)  (0.011)  (0.003)  (0.013) 
Income per capita * Human rights squared origin    0.000     
    (0.000)     
Income per capita * Human rights squared target    0.000***     
    (0.000)     
Income per capita squared * Human rights origin        0.000** 
        (0.000) 
Income per capita squared* Human rights target        0.000* 
        (0.000) 
Geographical distance  -105.718***  -109.297***  -107.629***  -118.851*** 
  (15.534)  (15.388)  (16.058)  (16.864) 
Population origin  0.000  0.000  0.001**  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Population target  0.001*  0.001  0.001*  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Constant  -8,872.542  -310,179.902**  291,170.283**  -411,655.244 
  (88,983.338)  (137,739.673)  (122,264.126)  (268,760.021) 
No. obs.  210  210  210  210 
No. states  15  15  15  15 
R
2  0.443  0.463  0.440  0.454 
Note: see Table 1 
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Appendix C: The role of linguistic factors 
 
Table C1: Determinants of interstate migration in India, 1999-2000, dep. var.: number of migrants from one state 










Income per capita origin  -0.903  -1.053  -1.201  -1.286 
  (2.287)  (2.231)  (2.204)  (2.140) 
Income per capita target  10.526***  10.376***  10.577***  10.492*** 
  (2.810)  (2.776)  (2.971)  (2.939) 
Hurman rights violations origin  6.450  5.055     
  (0.636)  (4.618)     
Human rights violations target  -1.392  -2.788     
  (0.802)  (3.772)     
Common language  -10,697.559  389,950.530***  -12,994.043  402,326.074*** 
  (27,181.933)  (73,981.378)  (27,262.559)  (72,258.772) 
Geographical distance  -117.110***  41.450  -115.742***  47.327* 
  (19.374)  (27.913)  (19.630)  (28.500) 
Common  language  dummy  * 
distance    -179.155***    -185.130*** 
    (32.962)    (31.447) 
Population origin  0.001  0.001**  0.002**  0.002** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Population target  0.002**  0.002**  0.002***  0.002*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Constant  -13,145.357 
-
407,935.358***  -40,859.604 
-
433,015.368*** 
  (133,395.910)  (150,644.185)  (139,952.560)  (157,904.537) 
No. obs.  210  210  210  210 
No. states  15  15  15  15 
R
2  0.398  0.427  0.383  0.415 
Notes: see Table 1 Are Human Rights and Economic Well-Being Substitutes?  
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Figure C1: Marginal effect of being in the same linguistic zone conditional on distance, specification (B2) 
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